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Economic research has focused intensely in recent years on the role played by financial 
markets for real economic activity.  Scholars have provided robust empirical evidence that 
broader, deeper financial markets are strongly associated, causally, with better prospects for 
future economic growth.
1 
Having established this basic finding, the research effort is now focused on the analysis 
of the mechanisms through which finance affects real economic activity.  What are the specific 
characteristics of financial markets that seem to affect firms and industries in non-financial 
sectors of production?
2  And, what specific characteristics of firms and industries are especially 
affected by finance so that it eventually translates into higher economic activity? So, for 
example, does it matter who receives credit in an industry?  Entrants?  Incumbent firms?  Is it the 
same if an industry has a few large firms, or whether instead entry always brings in younger, 
smaller firms? 
This paper goes straight to the heart of this line of research by investigating the role of 
well-defined characteristics of banking markets on equally well-defined characteristics in 
product markets.  More precisely, we investigate the impact of bank concentration and bank 
deregulation on measures of industry structure in non-financial sectors.   We ask whether 
concentration of market power in banking has an effect on the number of firms in a given sector, 
on firms’ average size, and on the overall firm-size distribution. 
                                                 
1 This work is based on ideas tracing back at least to Schumpeter (1912), and inspired by the early contributions of 
Goldsmith (1969), Gurley and Shaw (1955), and McKinnon (1973). Among the most recent contributors, we cite the 
work of King and Levine (1993 a,b), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), among many others. 
2 For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) have investigated the role of government ownership 
in banking; Levine (1999) has focused on the importance of the quality of legal protection of creditor rights;  
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The number of firms in a sector, average firm size and the composition between small 
and large firms are all important factors having a bearing on conduct and market performance.  
Such factors are therefore important determinants of a sector’s capital accumulation and 
consequently of its contribution to overall economic growth.  Seeking evidence of a link with 
specific characteristics of the banking industry thus brings the focus of analysis exactly on the 
question of how finance affects real economic activity. 
Using data on U.S. local markets for banking and non-financial sectors, we find that more 
vigorous banking competition – that is, lower concentration and looser restrictions on 
geographical expansion – is associated with more firms in operation and with a smaller average 
firm size.  In fact, we find that the share of firms in the smallest size category (fewer than five 
employees) increases most dramatically with better bank competition, mostly at the expense of 
firms with between 100 and 1,000 employees.  We find no effect of changes in banking 
competition, however, for the largest firms, which seems sensible given that these firms 
generally have access to nationwide securities markets. 
Whether bank competition is “good or bad” for economic activity has been and continues 
to be a lively topic of research and policy analysis.
3  In addition to the conventional argument 
that concentration of market power in banking means lower equilibrium amounts of credit, it has 
also been claimed that banking market power is actually needed for banks to establish valuable 
lending relationships.  Hence, whether more or less competition in banking is socially desirable 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) have instead explored the role of bank competition 
on firms’ growth performance. 
3 A conference titled “Bank Competition: Good or Bad?” was organized in 2000 by The Wharton School and the 
Center for Financial Studies at Frankfurt University. More recently, two conferences on the role of bank 
concentration and competition have been organized by the World Bank and by the Cleveland Fed-JMCB.  
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is still under discussion.  This paper thus contributes to expand our understanding of the 
economic role of bank concentration and competition.  
Various related streams of literature have focused on determinants of product market 
competition (e.g., Brander and Lewis (1986), Chevalier (1995), Kovenock and Phillips (1995, 
1997), Maksimovic (1988)), on firm size (e.g., Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2001), Campbell and 
Hopenhayn (2002)) and on firm-size distribution and more general industry dynamics (e.g., 
Lucas (1978), Jovanovic, (1982), Evans (1987), Hopenhayn (1992)).  This paper relates to these 
parallel lines of research and makes a contribution bridging them together.  
Our evidence is consistent with that documented in several recent papers focusing on 
banking concentration and competition policies across countries.  Cetorelli (2001) provides 
evidence of larger average firm size in countries with more concentrated banking.  Along similar 
lines, Cetorelli (2004) finds that enhanced bank competition following passage of the Second 
European Banking Directive brought a reduction in average firm size.  Matching data on job 
creation and destruction in US manufacturing sectors with banking data across US markets, 
Cetorelli (2003) shows that more bank concentration implies less entry and thriving of younger 
firms and also delayed exit of older firms.  Again based on cross-country data, Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) find that higher bank concentration is associated with more 
financing obstacles, especially for smaller firms.  Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2004) find 
evidence that bank deregulation in France led to more entry in bank-dependent sectors of 
production.  Exploiting historical census data from nineteenth century Mexico, Maurer and 
Haber (2003), find evidence that bank concentration favored lending to “connected” borrowers 
in the domestic textile industry over other competitors, even though these last ones exhibited  
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higher efficiency measures.  In contrast, Bonaccorsi and Dell’Arriccia (2004) find that 
concentration in banking reduces entry rates for Italian firms in industries with relatively opaque 
assets (i.e. few intangible assets) relative to entry in industries with less asset opacity. 
Ours is the first study to explore not only how average firm size responds to banking 
competition, but how the whole size distribution responds. This is an important improvement, in 
that we are able to test more directly whether more or less bank competition is beneficial for all 
firms in a sector, or whether instead the effect may be different for firms in distinct size classes. 
The analysis on the size distribution will also allow us to characterize more fully results obtained 
so far in the literature on average size: if indeed changes in bank competition have an impact on 
the average firm, we will be able to tell whether the effect is mainly on the smaller firms or on 
the larger ones or both.  Moreover, our data allow us to measure banking structure at a more 
local level.  This is a distinct advantage because much of the research on bank market power 
suggests that the relevant geographical market for banking services, especially for small firms or 
potential entrepreneurs, is local (see, for example, Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999).    
In the remainder of the paper we first flesh out the theoretical links between banking 
concentration and industrial structure in order to motivate our empirical tests.  In Section II we 
discuss our identification strategy, while in Section III we present the data set and the main 
variables used in the analysis.  Section IV documents the empirical results, and Section V 
concludes. 
I. Theoretical arguments 
How does bank competition affect the market structure of non-financial industries?  As 
pointed out in Cetorelli (2001), several countervailing forces are potentially in play.  One force  
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emphasizes that lending to opaque firms requires the bank and the borrower to forge a long-term 
relationship.  Information gained over the course of time by the bank can be used to make value-
enhancing credit decisions (i.e. expand credit to “winners” and restrict credit to “losers”).  Banks 
can sustain the cost of starting a relationship with unknown, risky entrepreneurs, however, only if 
market power allows them to recoup the cost at later stages if such entrants turn out to be 
successful.  This is an idea first presented by Mayer (1988) and then formalized and tested by 
Petersen and Rajan (1995).
4  To the extent that it forecloses the opportunity to extract profits 
from successful relationships, vigorous competition may mitigate banks’ willingness to invest in 
relationships at all.  This force, applied to our case, suggests that banks with market power 
should guarantee more industry entry than competitive banks would.  At the same time, because 
banks with market power charge higher rates to the older firms than competitive banks would, 
firms in non-competitive banking markets may not grow as large as they could otherwise.  All 
together, and ceteris paribus, one should expect to find more firms in an industry, a lower 
average firm size, and a larger prevalence of small rather than large firms where banks have 
more market power. 
Two countervailing forces suggest that market power may both dampen entry and reduce 
the relative importance of smaller firms.  First, bank market power may reduce credit availability 
generally.  This standard channel, whereby increased concentration in banking leads to less 
credit supply and higher loan prices, justifies antitrust enforcement.  While less credit hurts all 
firms, smaller firms and potential entrants are likely to be more reliant on bank credit than larger 
                                                 
4 Another solution is for the lender to hold an equity, or equity-like, claim against the establishment, as is commonly 
observed in the venture capital industry.  
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and better established firms.  Thus, these smaller firms may be harmed more by reduced credit 
supply than larger firms. 
In addition to this standard channel, banks with market power may tend to favor their 
established borrowers over new borrowers.  The value of a bank’s current lending relationships 
will depend on its borrowers’ future profitability, which in turn depends on prospective entry and 
growth of new competitors.  A bank’s incentive to support the profitability of its older clients 
could thus restrain its willingness to extend credit to potential industry entrants (or emerging 
small firms).  In recent papers, Spagnolo (2000) and Cestone and White (2003) have presented 
theoretical frameworks in which existing lending relationships do indeed affect the behavior of 
lenders vis-à-vis potential new borrowers.
5  The less competitive the conditions in the credit 
market, the lower the incentive for lenders to finance newcomers.  Hence, banking concentration 
(as well as regulatory impediments to competition) can represent a form of financial barrier to 
entry in product markets.  Banking market power may lead to fewer firms, a larger average firm 
size, and a higher proportion of large firms in markets where banks have more market power.
6 
II. Identification strategy 
These ideas suggest that banking competition potentially plays a key role in determining 
industry structure in product markets.  Either prospective entrants benefit at the expense of older 
incumbents with more bank competition, or the other way around.  
The difficulty in empirical implementation is that there may be common factors that drive 
the structure of both banking and industrial sectors that are difficult to measure and thus control 
                                                 
5 Also related are the contributions of Battacharya and Chiesa (1995) and Helmann and Da Rin (2002). 
6 This effect should be especially strong where the boundaries of product markets and lending markets coincide. 
Some product markets in our dataset may span multiple banking markets.  In such cases, a bank could still have an  
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in a regression.  For example, small markets may have fewer banks and also fewer non-financial 
firms.  Finding a positive association between bank concentration and product market 
concentration could simply pick up this market characteristic.  By the same token, banks have 
increasingly turned to analytical credit scoring models based on systematic statistical processing 
of information about borrower credit history, financial strength, and asset values.  This growing 
importance of “hard information” may have led to a corresponding decline in the value of 
lending relationships over time.  If technology adoption (which is difficult to measure 
empirically) exerts an independent effect on the structure of both banking and non-financial 
industry, then our ability to sort out how bank concentration affects industry structure may be 
confounded.
7 
Given these concerns, identification based on direct effects of changes in bank 
competition across industries in a market will not take us far.  We proceed instead with the idea 
that banks play a more important role for firms in some industries than in others.  Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) point out that industries differ in their dependence on external sources of 
finance.  These differences stem from industry-specific technological reasons affecting the initial 
project scale, the gestation period, the cash-harvest period, and the needs for further investments 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998, p. 563).  So, for example, a firm in a sector such as Tobacco or 
Leather is less likely to depend on external sources of finance (such as bank lending) than firms 
producing Electronics or Chemical equipment.  
                                                                                                                                                             
impact on entry within her area of influence.  But because we are unable to define product market boundaries, our 
results are, if anything, biased toward a non-result.  
7 Information technology may also have played a role in explaining deregulation of banking, although Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999) find that the strength of interest groups can explain the precise timing of deregulation across states.  
 
Page 9 of 41 
Given the richness of our data set (to be illustrated in the next section), we pursue 
identification by exploiting cross-industry differences in external financial dependence.  Firms in 
sectors more dependent on external finance ought to be affected more by variation (both across 
time and across markets) in bank competition.  More precisely, we use non-dependent sectors as 
a control group, which in an ‘experiment’ designed to gauge the effect of a change in bank 
competition is not expected to exhibit a response.  We can instead use dependent sectors as a 
treatment group that in the same experiment are expected to exhibit a response. We thus achieve 
identification by measuring the differential effect of a change in bank competition between the 
two groups.  So, going back to the first of our previous examples, if none of the theoretical 
arguments presented earlier bear any justification in the data, and if market size is all there is 
behind a positive correlation between bank concentration and product market structure, then a 
change in bank competition should not have any differential effect between treatment and control 
groups.  But if, say, bank competition actually implies greater opportunities for entry, then such 
effects should be larger on the treatment sectors.  
We implement this strategy by estimating regression models fitting into the following 
general structure: 
(1)       
,
jst jst st jt
js t j s t
Y Employment share Market trends Industry trends
Bank dependence Bank competition ε





where in separate regressions Y will equal the number of firms, average firm size, or a measure 
of the entire size distribution of industry sector j in market s over time t.  The industry j share of 
total manufacturing employment in market s over time t controls for the relative importance of a  
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given sector in a market.
8  The Market trendsst are vectors of market/time indicator variables 
controlling for any local market, time-varying effect on industry structure.  Similarly, Industry 
trendsjt are industry/time indicator variables controlling for industry-specific, time-varying 
factors.  By including the two sets of fixed effects, we fully absorb any common confounding 
factor that could trouble identification, thereby minimizing the risk that our results will be driven 
by either reverse causality (changes in industry structure driving changes in banking structure), 
or by an omitted factor (e.g. technological changes that drive both banking structure or 
regulations and the structure of non-financial businesses). Consistent with the identification 
strategy, note that the direct effect of bank dependence is not identified because its effects are 
fully captured by the set of industry-level fixed effects.  Similarly, the direct effect of bank 
competition is also not identified; its effects are fully captured by the market-level fixed effects. 
The coefficients of interest, which measure the effect of bank competition, are identified 
by estimating a vector of three separate interaction terms between an industry-specific external 
bank dependence measures with three alternative measures of bank competition (described 
below).  For instance, consider a regression where the dependent variable is a measure of the 
number of firms in operation in each industry.  If an increase in bank competition facilitates 
entry, then this increase in the number of firms should be especially pronounced for sectors with 
a high degree of bank dependence.  Thus, the interaction of bank dependence with bank 
                                                 
8 In studies of cross-sector industrial growth, such a measure consistently predicts that sectors that had grown 
substantially in the past, and therefore are already relatively large, grow less in the future (see Rajan and Zingales, 
1998 and Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). Moreover, theories of an industry’s life-cycle predict that a sector that has 
already grown substantially should experience less intensive firm entry (see Klepper, 1996).  Hence, the share 
variable controls for the stage in industry life-cycle a sector is in, and specifically it should capture the different 
intensity in entry due to life-cycle specific reasons.  
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competition will be positive and significant.  The opposite would be true if entry were more 
likely where banks have market power.   
 
III. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
We have constructed a panel data set of manufacturing establishments in operation across 
U.S. states between 1977 and 1994.
9  Data on establishments are available at a disaggregated 
level on an annual basis from the County Business Patterns, which is an annual survey by the 
Census Bureau.  These data provide the best way to consider industry structure over a long span 
of time at a disaggregated level.  Moving to a more finely disaggregated level, either by industry 
SIC code or by locality, creates substantial difficulties with missing values, so we have decided 
to focus on the 2-digit level of aggregation by industry and the state level for geography.  We 
focus on just industries within the manufacturing sector.  From this data set, we compute the total 
number of establishments in an industry/state/year, and the average establishment size (workers 
per establishment).  As shown in Table I, there are, on average, 0.07 establishments per capita, 
and the average establishment has 69 workers. 
TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
To characterize the whole distribution of establishment sizes, we construct the share of 
establishments in an industry, state and year in each of four categories: establishments with 
fewer than five employees, establishments with five to 19 employees, establishments with 20 to 
99 employees, establishments with 100 to 999 employees, and establishments with 1,000 or more 
employees.  Unconditionally, 31 percent of establishments are in the smallest size category,  
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while 86 percent of establishments have fewer than 100 employees (Table I). 
Before moving forward, it is worth noting that our data are based on employment at 
establishments rather than at firms.  An establishment is an economic unit where production 
occurs, such as a plant, a factory, or a restaurant that employs people.  So, there is some 
measurement error in our dependent variable induced by the fact that large firms often own many 
establishments.  Data from The Economic Census, however, suggest that most firms are 
composed of just one establishment.  For example, in 1997 there were a total of 316,952 
manufacturing companies; of these, 295,876 were single-establishment companies, about 94% of 
the total.  Also, at the same time there were a total of 381,696 establishments in operation. So, 
single-establishment companies represented 78% of total establishments.
10 
A. Constructing an instrument for bank dependence 
  As we discussed in the previous section, the effects of banking competition on industry 
structure ought to depend on the relative bank dependence of firms in an industry.  The trick 
empirically is to construct a measure of bank dependence that reflects demand for bank finance, 
rather than one that confounds demand-side effects with variation in the availability of credit 
supply from banks.
11  As indicated by the summary statistics for establishments, most firms are 
small.  Moreover, the theoretical arguments illustrated earlier all emphasize the role of banks for 
small firms and potential entrants.  We thus began by constructing a measure of bank finance 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The choice for the sample period is justified later on in this section, when we describe the history of deregulation 
of the U.S. banking industry. 
10 These proportions are similar looking back at previous Census data.  Early research has also shown that, for 
example, the rate of creation of new businesses is correlated with the share of new establishments in a local 
economy (Black & Strahan, 2002). The existence of a close correlation between the number of establishments and 
the number of firms is also documented in Cetorelli (2001) for a cross-section of countries. 
11 Variation in bank credit supply introduces noise (measurement error) into the actual use by small firms of bank 
finance.  Moreover, the extent of that noise will be greater for firms in industries that are more bank dependent.  
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using data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance.  This survey was conducted by the 
Federal Reserve and covers a sample of 3,561 small firms with fewer than 500 employees.  The 
sample was designed to be nationally representative, but was structured to ensure representation 
across firm-size categories, location, and race of the owner.  For each 2-digit SIC manufacturing 
sector, we constructed firms’ share of assets financed with debt (loans, capital leases and lines of 
credit) from financial institutions (“loans”) for the firm at the median of the distribution.  These 
loans are supplied mainly by commercial banks (70% of the surveyed firms use banks for credit), 
but they also include some funds from other depository institutions (thrifts, credit unions) as well 
as unregulated finance companies (Bitler, Robb and Wolken, 2001).  This variable represents the 
actual use of bank finance by small firms, as a share of their balance sheet.
12  
Despite the appeal of such measure to capture firms’ need for bank finance, the very fact 
that the data is based on small firms, with relatively limited access to external suppliers of 
finance, raises the possibility that such accounting measures could not be clean measures of 
demand.  We therefore proceed by constructing an instrument for bank dependence using 
information from Compustat firms and justify that choice by documenting its high correlation 
with small firms’ actual use of bank (and other intermediary) funds.  Our procedure follows 
closely the one described in Rajan and Zingales (1998).  The key identifying assumption, as in 
Rajan and Zingales, is that the use of finance by Compustat firms allows us to observe their 
demand for external funds.  These firms are large and well established, with far better access to 
well-developed U.S. securities markets than small firms.  Hence, there is a much higher 
likelihood that observed financial policy is not skewed by constraints on the supply side. 
                                                 
12 The Survey of Small Business Finance only reports data for a single year, hence balance sheet measures are more  
 
Page 14 of 41 
We begin by taking all of the Compustat firms between 1980 and 1997 and carefully 
separate firms based on the number of years they have been on Compustat.  More precisely, we 
exclude “young” Compustat firms, i.e. firms that had gone public only recently.  A measure of 
external financial dependence for such firms is likely to be non-representative of the typical 
needs of a firm in a given sector due to selection bias: firms that have just gone public have a 
voracious appetite for external funds – satisfying this high demand is a large reason that they 
went public in the first place.  Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we define as “young” those 
firms in Compustat for 10 years or less, and we define as “mature” those firms appearing in 
Compustat for more than 10 years.
13 
To construct external financial dependence, we sum across all years each firm’s total 
capital expenditures (Compustat item #128) minus cash flow from operations.  Cash flows from 
operations equals revenues minus non-depreciation costs (Compustat item #110) plus decreases 
in inventories and accounts receivable plus increases in accounts payable.
14  This sum equals the 
total external funds needed to finance investments.  If the total is negative, it means the firm had 
free cash flow available for disbursement to shareholders or to pay down debt; otherwise, the 
firm needed to raise additional capital to finance its investment.  We then divide this free cash 
                                                                                                                                                             
representative of financial policy than flow-based measures using capital expenditures and gross cash flow. 
13 We have also changed the cut off point to 5 years instead of 10. The resulting new measure of external financial 
dependence for “mature” firms had a correlation of 0.98 with that used following Rajan and Zingales.  The 
regression results we present later on were not qualitatively affected by the choice of this alternative definition of 
mature firms.  
14 In other words, we subtract investments in net working capital from cash flow.  The numerator of external 
financial dependence equals the negative of “free cash flow” as traditionally defined in capital budgeting problems.  
We have also constructed an external financial dependence measure that normalizes this figure by net long-term 
investment (capital expenditures minus depreciation) and also by net total investment (i.e. capital expenditure minus 
depreciation plus the change in net working capital).  These measures are highly correlated with the one used here 
(ρ=0.89 and ρ=0.70, respectively).  Note also that the Compustat items mentioned in the text are only defined for 
cash flow statements with codes 1, 2 or 3.  For format code 7, we use the sum of items #123, 125, 126, 106, 213 and 
217.   
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flow figure by total capital expenditure.  After constructing this ratio for each firm, we use the 
median value for all firms in each 2-digit SIC category. 
Table II reports our measures of external financial dependence for mature Compustat 
firms and that calculated from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance.  Looking across 
sectors, we find that leather and leather products, tobacco manufactures and apparel have the 
lowest need for external funds as mature firms, whereas electronic equipment and chemicals and 
related products exhibit the highest need for external finance.  Moreover, the correlation between 
the two measures of external financial dependence is high (ρ=0.51), thus suggesting that external 
financial dependence for mature Compustat firms makes a powerful instrument for small firms’ 
demand for bank credit.  
TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
As described in the previous section, we want to emphasize the distinction between low-
dependent sectors (the control group) and high-dependent ones (the treatment group).  Hence, we 
use an indicator variable for a firm’s external financial dependence in our base specification 
equal to one if the use of external funds for mature Compustat firms is positive and zero 
otherwise.  Beyond permitting a clean interpretation of the results, the indicator for external 
financial dependence will not be skewed by the very high level of cash flow relative to 
investment for three sectors – Leather, Tobacco and Apparel – documented in Table II.  For 
robustness, however, we also report results using the continuous measure of external financial 
dependence for mature Compustat firms (rather than a zero-one indicator variable), as well as the  
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loans-to-assets ratio for small firms.
15 
  Table III compares investment and financing behavior for Compustat firms by our 
measure of external financial dependence.  These simple comparisons show that differences in 
external financial dependence are not correlated with differences in investment rates, market 
valuation, or size.  For both groups, for example, the investment rate (capital expenditures 
divided by / property, plant & equipment), the book-to-market equity ratio, and real sales are 
approximately equal.  Also, external funds – for those firms that continue to need them – are 
raised mostly by borrowing; the median mature firm uses no equity to finance new projects.  
Thus, the greater demand for external finance at mature firms does not seem to reflect greater 
growth or investment opportunities; instead, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales, external 
finance reflects differences in the incubation period before assets begin to generate sufficient 
cash to finance the firm.  Thus, we can be confident that differences in response to bank 
competition across these two groups of industries reflect difference in their financing needs, 
rather than differences in their real investment behavior.
16 
TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
B. Competition in the local banking market 
  We focus on several measures of competition in the local banking industry.  Our first two 
measures exploit policy innovations.  Restrictions on bank expansion across geographical 
                                                 
15 While mature firms in Compustat clearly have access to alternative sources of finance beyond banks (e.g. bonds 
or public equity), our identifying assumption is that demand for external credit for small and medium-sized firms 
will look similar to demand for external funds by mature Compustat firms.  Since smaller firms do not have access 
to public securities markets, we argue that their ability to raise external funds will depend critically on the 
competitiveness of the local banking market. 
16 Implicit in our identification strategy is the assumption that external financial dependence is constant over time, or 
at least that the industry ordering is not altered substantially. Since we compute external financial dependence using 
mature Compustat firms, presumably closer to industry steady state conditions, this assumption seems reasonable.  
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boundaries in the United States date back to the nineteenth century.  Although there was some 
deregulation of branching restrictions in the 1930s, most states either prohibited branching 
altogether (the “unit banking” states) or limited branching until the 1970s, when only twelve 
states allowed unrestricted statewide branching.  Between 1970 and 1994, however, 38 states 
deregulated their restrictions on branching (see Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996, Kroszner and 
Strahan, 1999 and Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). 
  In addition to facing restrictions on in-state branching, the Douglas Amendment to the 
1956 Bank Holding Company Act prohibited a bank holding company from acquiring banks 
outside the state where it was headquartered unless the target bank’s state permitted such 
acquisitions.  Since no state allowed such transactions in 1956, the amendment effectively barred 
interstate banking organizations.  Starting in the earlier 1980s, many states began to enter 
regional or national reciprocal arrangements whereby their banks could be bought by any other 
state in the arrangement.  This history presents us with a convenient way to test how industry 
structure in non-financial sectors has been affected by the increased competition (real and 
potential) in banking that followed state-level deregulation.
17 
We capture the effects of each type of deregulation by including an indicator equal to one 
after a state permits branching by means of merger and acquisition within its borders, and 
another indicator equal to one after a state permits interstate banking (that is, after a state allows 
bank holding companies from other states to buy their banks).
18  The two types of deregulation 
                                                 
17Deregulation of restrictions on bank expansion, both within and across states, has been shown to improve bank 
efficiency, to enhance corporate control, and to limit market power.  See Jayaratne and Strahan (1998). 
18 Most states first permit banks to branch by buying existing branches in new markets or by purchasing whole 
banks and then creating branches out of the purchased bank’s offices.  Then, states typically open up their markets to 
unrestricted branching in which banks may open new branches anywhere in the state.  
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are somewhat distinct in their effects.  Deregulation of restrictions on branching reduces entry 
barriers into new markets and also enhances the corporate takeover market by making it easier 
for banks to gain control over other bank’s assets.  With full branching deregulation, a bank may 
enter a new market, either by buying existing branches or by opening new branches.  Also, the 
cost of acquiring another bank is reduced because an acquiring bank may merge the target bank’s 
operation into its existing franchise.  By reducing entry barriers, branching deregulation 
constrains banks’ ability to exploit market power.  Interstate banking deregulation, however, 
only affects who can own bank assets.  Prior to deregulation, only bank holding companies 
located within a state may buy banks chartered in that state, while, after deregulation, bank 
holding companies operating in other states may do so. 
  In addition to looking at changes in competition induced by deregulation of the industry, 
we also include a direct measure of local market concentration, equal to the deposit Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI).  The HHI is calculated as the deposit-weighted average of the HHI 
indexes of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in a state/year.  The Herfindahl index for 
each local market is defined as the sum of squared market shares, where market shares are based 
on branch-level deposit data from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits dataset.
19  So, for example, if 
a bank owned 10 branches within an MSA, this bank’s market share would equal the sum of all 
of its deposits in those 10 branches, divided by the total deposits held in by all bank branches 
within that market.  For a market with a single bank owning all of the branches, the HHI would 
equal one, whereas in a perfectly atomistic market the HHI would approach zero. 
                                                 
19 The deposit HHI is the standard tool used in antitrust oversight of bank mergers.  Local markets (usually MSAs or 
non-MSA counties) with HHI below 0.18 are deemed to be served by enough banks to assume that conditions are 
competitive.  For localities with HHI above 0.18, antitrust concerns by the Federal Reserve and the Department of  
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The history of U.S. banking deregulation defines the lower and upper bound of our 
sample period.  Our panel data starts in 1977, the beginning of the period of dramatic state-level 
deregulation.  We end the sample in 1994, when deregulation of restrictions on banks’ ability to 
expand across local markets was completed with passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act.  After 1994, it becomes increasingly less plausible to view 
markets in banking as local, both because of the completion of deregulation and because the 
advent of new technologies in bank lending began allowing banks to lend to borrowers not 
physically close to their bank.  For example, Petersen and Rajan (2002) show that banks during 
the 1990s are much more likely to lend over long geographic distances than they were in the 
1970s.  Also, banks began to operate branches across state lines for the first time in 1995.
20 
 
IV.  Results 
A. Difference-in-differences estimates 
As noted above, our identification strategy is to emphasize the differential effects of bank 
competition across bank dependent and non-dependent sectors.  Table IV illustrates this strategy 
based on a simple ‘difference-in-differences’ estimate of the effect of changes in concentration 
and regulation on establishment size.  We simply average the data across four groups: sectors 
with high and low external financial dependence and markets/years with high and low bank 
concentration (Panel A) or with tight and relaxed bank regulation (Panel B).  Establishment size 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice are sometimes raised.  See Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) for an overview of bank mergers and 
antitrust policy. 
20 For example, NationsBank consolidated banks from several other states into its primary North Carolina bank 
(NationBank NC N.A.), leading to an increase of this bank’s assets from $31 billion in 1994 to $79 billion in 1995.  
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is consistently higher among sectors with high external financial dependence (the “treatment” 
group) than sectors with low external financial dependence (the “control” group).  But our 
estimate depends on the relative response of the two groups to changes in competition.  For 
example, in the treatment group establishment size is 11 employees higher in banking markets 
with low concentration (HHI below 0.14) compared to highly concentrated markets (HHI above 
0.24).  But establishment size in the control group is 20 employees higher in the less 
concentrated banking markets.  Thus, the estimated effect of decreased banking concentration 
(increased competition) is a decline of nine employees on average: 11-20 = -9. 
TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
Panel A thus illustrates the importance of our identification strategy; by focusing on the 
direct effect of concentration, one might conclude that raising banking competitiveness leads to 
larger firms.  Establishment size, however, is negatively correlated with banking market 
concentration for reasons having nothing to do with banking competition.  Rural and relatively 
sparsely populated states tend to have fewer banks and hence higher measures of banking 
concentration, and these states also tend to have smaller establishments on average.  Comparing 
the response of the two industry sectors removes these state effects from the difference-in-
differences estimate.  In the regressions below, state differences are removed by including the 
full set of state/year fixed effects. 
In Panel B, we consider varying the regulatory status of banking markets.  Moving from 
fully regulated (no branching or interstate banking) to fully deregulated (branching and interstate 
banking permitted), average establishment size declines by four employees in the control group.  
In contrast, size falls by 16 employees in the treatment group.  In this example, then, our  
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difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of deregulation would equal a decline of 12 
employees: -16 - (-4) = -12.  These simple mean comparisons illustrate the identification strategy 
embedded in our regressions (see equation 1), which we turn to next.  
B. Regression results for size and number of establishments  
Table V reports our regression results for the log of the number of establishments and the 
log of establishment size (average employees per establishment).  The first two columns report 
the results using an indicator variable to separate firms into two groups: those with positive 
external financial dependence, and those with negative dependence.  These results are most 
closely related to the difference-in-differences calculations in Table IV because we can think 
about a treatment group response versus a control group response.  Columns 3 and 4 report the 
interaction effects of the continuous measure of external financial dependence for the mature 
Compustat firms with our three banking competition measures, and the last two columns are 
based on interacting the loans/assets ratio for small firms with bank competition.  As noted 
above, we include a full set of industry/year and state/year fixed effects; these capture all of the 
direct effects of external financial dependence (an industry characteristic) and bank competition 
(a market characteristic) on establishment size.  Thus, only the coefficients on the interaction 
terms are identified in these models. 
TABLE V ABOUT HERE 
All six specifications in Table V support the idea that increased bank competition through 
lower banking concentration is associated with greater entry (i.e. more total establishments) and 
a smaller average establishment size.  While somewhat less robust across our measures of 
external financial dependence, the results also suggest that deregulation, particularly relaxation  
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of restrictions on interstate banking, come with an increase in the number of firms and a 
reduction in size.  This finding mirrors Black and Strahan (2002), who find the interstate banking 
reform was followed by an increase in the formation of new incorporations.
21 
In Table VI, we use the coefficients from above (Table V) to assess the economic 
importance of increased banking competition on the number and size of establishments.  We 
report effects similar to the difference-in-differences of Table IV, but now measure percentage 
changes rather than absolute changes since both dependent variables are measured in logs.  For 
example, we report the percentage change in the number and size of establishments stemming 
from a move from full regulation (no branching or interstate banking) to full deregulation 
(branching and interstate banking permitted) for financially dependent industries relative to less 
dependent industries.  And, we measure the effect of moving banking concentration from the 
75
th to the 25
th percentile of its distribution (HHI changes from 0.24 to 0.14).  These percentage 
changes allow a simple way to assess the economic significance of the results. 
TABLE VI ABOUT HERE 
Columns 1 and 2 report economic effects for our preferred measure of external financial 
dependence, which simply uses an indicator variable to separate sectors into low and high 
external financial dependence.  These results suggest that deregulation, and the associated 
increase in banking competition, increased the number of establishments by 11.6 percent in the 
                                                 
21 We have also tested for a structural break in the link from our three bank competition measures to industry 
structure by interacting each measure with a post-1985 indicator variable (1985 is the midpoint of our sample).  This 
test is motivated by the increasing use of information technology in the latter half of the sample, which may have 
reduced the importance of relationships in bank lending and thus altered the role of market power in shaping 
industry structure.  We find, however, no such break; these coefficients are stable over time.  The F-test for the 
structural break equals 1.17 (p-value = 0.31) for the model based on the number of establishments, and 1.32 (p-value 
= 0.26) for the model based on average establishment size.  A plausible explanation for this is that the widespread  
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dependent sectors relative to non-dependent sectors, and reduced relative establishment size by 
12.3 percent.  Reducing banking concentration from 0.24 to 0.14 increases the number of firms 
by 4.6% and reduces average firm size by 9.3%. 
The next four columns repeat this exercise using the two alternate measures of external 
financial dependence.  Dependence equals the level of external funds needed to finance 
investment (columns 3 and 4) or the median loans/assets ratio for small firms represented in the 
1998 SSBF (columns 5 and 6).  Since these are continuous variables, we report the relative 
effects of increased banking competition comparing industries at the 75
th percentile of the 
external financial dependence (loan/assets) distribution, with its effects on industries at the 25
th 
percentile of the distribution.  For example, we are comparing how bank competition affects a 
financially dependent industry like Petroleum and coal products (SIC=29) with one like Food 
and Kindred Product (SIC=20).  As noted above in Table II, the level of external financial 
dependence is skewed by three “cash cow” industries generating substantially more funds than 
they need (Leather, Tobacco, and Apparel).  Nevertheless, the economic significance of a 
decrease in banking concentration is only slightly smaller than what comes from the indicator 
variable models; the number of establishments increases by 3.6% with lower bank concentration 
and size declines by 6.9%.  In contrast, the effects of deregulation are considerably smaller in 
these models.  However, if we reduce the influence of the three outlier industries by setting their 
external financial dependence to -0.24 (the level of external financial dependence for the fourth 
least dependent sector), the economic significance moves much closer to what comes out of the 
indicator variable specifications.  Moving from full regulation to full deregulation now increases 
                                                                                                                                                             
adoption of the new lending technologies really only occurred during the last 10 years or so, hence outside of our  
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the number of establishments by 6.2% and decreases average size by 8.2% (figures not reported 
in the table).  
In the last two columns, economic significance is somewhat smaller for reductions in 
banking concentration than what comes from the indicator variable model.  For deregulation, the 
effects are larger based on establishment size but smaller based on the number of establishments.  
It is worth repeating, however, that we view these results as robustness tests only because the use 
of external bank finance (loans) by small firms may reflect to some extent supply-side 
constraints stemming from the absence of banking competition. 
C. Characterizing changes in the establishment size distribution 
The results so far indicate that improvements in bank competitive conditions lead to more 
establishments and to a smaller average establishment size.  These two changes could reflect 
entry by very small establishments; if so, then we would expect an increase in mass at the 
smallest end of the size distribution, and declines in mass elsewhere in the distribution.  If better 
bank competition also helps existing small firms grow (due to an increased supply of financial 
resources), then we ought to see a greater proportion not only of the smallest but also of mid-
sized establishments as well.  Moreover, testing for shifts in the whole size distribution allows us 
to compare how the shares of small and mid-sized (presumably bank dependent) establishments 
behave relative to another sort of ‘control’ group, namely the share of the very largest 
establishments.  These establishments (those with 1,000 or more employees) should not be 
affected by banking conditions because very large firms have access to nationwide (and 
competitive) securities markets.  Thus, their fortunes should not vary with local credit conditions. 
                                                                                                                                                             
sample period.  
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To explore these issues, we now report the effects of changes in bank competition on the 
share of establishments at different points along the employment-size distribution (Tables 7 and 
8).  Each column in the two tables corresponds to the proportion of establishments in a given size 
bin.  For example, in column one the dependent variable is based on the share of establishments 
with fewer than five employees, in column two the share of establishments with five to 19 
employees, etc.  To mitigate the possibility of heteroskedasticity, in Table VII we transform 
these proportions using the logit function (i.e. the log {P / (1-P)}, where P equals the proportion 
of establishments in a given size bin).  Note that because we disaggregate the data both by 
industry and state, there are a large number of observations with zero establishments in the over-
1,000 category.  Because the logit model is not feasible for this group, we also report the results 
based on the raw proportions (Table VIII).  These coefficients are also easier to interpret than 
logit coefficients. 
TABLE VII ABOUT HERE 
The results in Table VII are again consistent with the earlier finding that increases in 
banking competition lead to increases in the importance of small firms.  That is, the size 
distribution of establishments shifts to the left (toward small establishments) as the banking 
industry becomes increasingly competitive.  Reduced bank concentration increases the share of 
firms in the first three size bins: fewer than five employees, five to 19 employees, and 20 to 99 
employees (i.e. the sign of the coefficient on local-market HHI is negative).  The effect of 
concentration is greatest for the smallest, and presumably most bank dependent, size group.  But 
the increase in the share of firms in the next two size bins indicates that small incumbent firms 
also benefit from greater banking competition (assuming that most entry occurs among the  
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smallest establishment).  Conversely, we observe a decline in the share of firms in the 100 to 999 
employee-size group with decreases in banking concentration (i.e. a positive coefficient in the 
HHI).   
In contrast to concentration, bank deregulation, particularly interstate banking reform, 
seems to be positively related to the share of firms in the second and third smallest categories, 
whereas there is no significant effect on the smallest establishments.  This increase in small 
establishments again occurs at the expense of firms with 100 to 999 employees.  Interstate 
banking deregulation allows entry by large out-of-state banking organizations, which may 
explain why this reform seems to aid the medium-sized establishments more than the smallest 
establishments.  Branching reform allows banks to expand, but only within state boundaries (at 
least until 1995, when inter-state branching began).  Thus, branching reform enhances 
competition but has much less of an impact on the presence of large banks.  Its effects seem most 
concentrated on the smallest establishments.  (Branching deregulation, while not significant in 
Table VII, is positive and significant for the smallest bin in Table VIII.) 
TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE 
  Table VIII reports the results based on the raw share of establishment in each size bin.  
Here, we lose some statistical significance but gain a convenient way to assess the economic 
magnitudes of the results.  For example, moving bank concentration from the 75
th to the 25
th 
percentile (a decline of 0.1) comes with an increase in the share of establishments in the smallest 
size bin of 0.83 percentage points, or a three percent increase in the unconditional mean (31 
percent).  The same decline in concentration comes with an increase of 0.15 percentage points in 
the share in the second smallest size bin, and an increase of 0.40 percentage points in the third  
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smallest bin.  The increased presence of small firms seems to come again from firms in the 100 
to 999 employee group.  According to Table VIII, this share declines by about 1.5 percentage 
points, which is about 12 percent of the unconditional mean (13 percent).    
Table VIII also lets us test whether another ‘control’ group - the largest establishments - 
are affected by changes in local banking competition.  In fact, we find no significant change in 
the relative importance of the very largest establishments, those with more than 1,000 
employees.  This lack of reaction to changes in banking competition makes sense because the 
largest establishments are likely to be part of firms with access to nationwide securities markets.  
Hence, their access to financial resources does not depend on conditions in local banking 
markets. 
As a final test, we have considered whether regulatory changes altered the effects of 
banking concentration on the establishment size distribution.  Black and Strahan (2002) argue 
that after states opened up their local banking markets to outside entry, the effects of 
concentration ought to have been mitigated by the threat of entry.  That is, banking concentration 
no longer signals market power when barriers to entry from regulations have been eliminated.  
And, in fact, they find that the effect of concentration on the rate of creation of new 
incorporations does fall significantly with deregulation.  We have run similar tests using our 
measures of the size distribution and the number of establishments.  Specifically, we add 
variables interacting the deregulation variables with our measure of bank concentration (and the 
industry external financial dependence measures).  In these regressions (not reported), we do 
estimate a generally positive coefficient (six out of eight) on these interaction terms, suggesting  
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that the effects of concentration on the size distribution may be attenuated by regulatory reform.  
These additional interaction effects, however, are not statistically significant. 
 
V. Conclusions 
We have found that more vigorous competition in local U.S. banking markets – lower 
MSA-level bank concentration and looser state-level restrictions on bank entry – reduces the size 
of the typical establishment.  Better bank competition also increases the share of establishments 
in the smallest size group, and increases the total number of establishments.  Significantly, 
changes in bank competition have no effect on the largest establishments, which makes sense 
given their access to financial resources in the commercial paper, corporate bond and equity 
markets. 
  Theory does not paint a clear picture about how competition in banking ought to affect 
the firm-size distribution, but the empirical work does.  Comparing industry structure across 
local markets within the U.S., or comparing structure across a large number of countries (both 
developed and developing), one reaches the same conclusion.  Our empirical evidence is 
consistent with the idea that banks with market power erect an important financial barrier to 
entry to the detrimant of the entrepreneurial sector of the economy, perhaps in part to protect the 
profitability of their existing borrowers.  The evidence thus indicates that  bank competition has a 
significant impact on important structural characteristics of sectors of production.  Moreover, it 
indicates that such impact is not uniform across firms, but rather that depending on the degree of 
bank competition some firms may benefit while others may lose.  This is an important insight 
updating the conventional wisdom that bank competition is either good or bad overall.   
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  The policy implications associated with this issue are especially relevant.  Banking 
market structure is a traditional policy variable whose control regulators across countries and 
over time often attempt to influence, although sometimes in conflicting ways.  For example, in 
the United States bank mergers have sometimes been altered to avoid excessive concentration in 
local markets.  At the same time, however, until the 1980s many states protected their banks 
from competition through branching and interstate banking restrictions.  Similar restraints on 
competition have been common elsewhere; for example, many countries continue to protect their 
banks from foreign entry.  One can well understand why political forces lead to tight restraints 
on banking competition if both incumbent banks and incumbent firms benefit from the restraints.  
In fact, Rajan and Zingales (2003) use historical evidence to argue very broadly that incumbent 
firms often fought hardest to prevent financial openness, sometimes leading to long-term 
declines in a country’s growth prospects. 
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This table reports summary statistics for data used in our panel regressions.  The unit of observation varies at the 
state-industry-year level.  Data on establishments are from the County Business Patterns, 1977-1994.  The HHI, our 
measure of concentration, is built up from HHIs at the city level (Metropolitan Statistical Area).  By city, we 
construct the sum of squared share of deposits for each banking company.  We then average this concentration 
measure across all MSAs within the state, weighted by total deposits in each MSA (source: FDIC Summary of 
Deposits).  The post branching deregulation indicator equals 1 during all years in which a state permits instate 
branching; the post interstate banking deregulation indicator equals 1 during all years in which a state permits out-
of-state banking companies to buy banks headquartered in the state.  For a detailed discussion of the banking 





Establishments Per Capita 
 
0.07 0.09 
Share of Establishments with < 5 Employees 
 
0.31 0.15 
Share of Establishments with 5 to 19 Employees 
 
0.31 0.12 
Share of Establishments with 20 to 99 Employees 
 
0.24 0.11 
Share of Establishments with 100 to 999 Employees 
 
0.13 0.12 
Share of Establishments with more than 1,000 Employees 
 
0.01 0.02 
Average Establishment Size (employees per establishment) 
 
69 83 
HHI (sum of squared local-market deposit share) 
 
0.19 0.07 
Post Branching Deregulation Indicator 
 
0.60 - 
Post Interstate Banking Deregulation Indicator 
 
0.45 -  
 




External Financial Dependence for Manufacturing Sectors 
 
External financial dependence equals the proportion of capital expenditures financed with external funds.  A 
negative value indicates that firms have free cash flow, whereas a positive value indicates firms must issue debt or 
equity to finance their investment.  The figures represent the median value for Compustat firms in each industry 
sector over the 1980 to 1997 period.  Mature firms are those that have been on Compustat for 10 years or more.  The 
rows are sorted by the external finance measure for mature firms, which is our baseline measure of an industry’s 
long-term financing needs.  The loans/assets ratio is the median ratio of loans to assets for small firms from the 


















Leather and leather products (31)  0.04  -0.96   
Tobacco manufactures (21)  N/A  -0.92   
Apparel and other textiles (23)  0.13  -0.61   
Food and kindred products (20)  0.12  -0.24   
Fabricated metal products (34)  0.27  -0.24   
Furniture and fixtures (25)  0.36  -0.23   
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products (32)  0.31  -0.20   
Miscellaneous manufacturing (39)  0.28  -0.20   
Printing and publishing (27)  0.33  -0.07   
Instruments and related products (38)  0.29  -0.04   
Transportation equipment (37)  0.06  0.01   
Industrial machinery and equipment (35)  0.21  0.01   
Primary metal industries (33)  0.31  0.03   
Lumber and wood products (24)  0.49  0.04   
Rubber and plastic products (30)  0.30  0.04   
Paper and allied products (26)  0.37  0.06   
Petroleum and coal products (29)  0.60  0.09   
Textile mill products (22)  0.47  0.10   
Electrical and electronic equipment (36)  0.14  0.22   
Chemicals and allied products (28)  0.33  0.28   
Median 0.30  0   
Correlation between the two:  0.51 
  
 




Median Industry-Level Investment and Financing Characteristics for  
Mature Compustat Firms, by External financial dependence 
 
This table reports the average of the industry-level median characteristics for mature Compustat firms (i.e. firms in 
Compustat for at least 10 years).  External financial dependence equals the share of capital expenditures financed 
with external funds; equity finance equals the share of capital expenditures financed by issuance of new equity 
(negative values indicate that cash is paid out to equity holders); debt finance equals the share of capital 
expenditures financed by new borrowing (negative values indicates reductions in outstanding debt).  Real sales are 
expressed in 1997 dollars, based in the Consumer Price Index. 








        
External Financial Dependence 
 
0.05 -0.23     
Equity Finance 
 
0 0     
Debt Finance 
 
0.05 -0.23     
Capital expenditures / Property, plant & equipment 
 
0.19 0.19     
Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 
 
0.66 0.68     
Median Real Sales (1997 Millions of Dollars) 
 











Comparison of Mean Establishment Size 
For Competitive Versus Non-competitive Banking Markets 
 
This table reports a simple difference-in-differences estimate of the effects on average establishment size of moving 
from a regulated to an unregulated market, or from a concentrated to an unconcentrated market.  Concentrated 
markets have an HHI in the first quartile of the distribution (HHI > 0.24); unconcentrated markets have an HHI in 
the top quartile (HHI < 0.14).  Regulated markets allow neither branching nor interstate banking; deregulated 
markets permit both.  The “treatment” group is represented by industries with above-median needs for external 
finance. The “control” group is represented by industries with below-median needs for external finance. A ‘*’ 
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; a ‘**’ denotes significance at 1%, based on a simple t-test.   
    
  Panel A: Banking Markets with   






(1) “Treatment” group 
 
82 71  11 
(2) “Control” group 
 
61 41  20 
    21 30   
  Difference-in-Differences =  -9** 
      
      
      
  Panel B: Banking Markets with   






(3) “Treatment” group 
 
74 90  -16 
(4) “Control” group 
 
52 56  -4 
 22  34   
  Difference-in-Differences =  -12** 
     
 




Regression of Log of Establishment Size and Log of Number of Establishments on Bank 
Competition Variables 
 
Each column in this table reports statistics from a fixed effects regression, where the dependent variable is the log of 
the total number of establishments per capita (columns labeled “number”) or the log of average number of workers 
per establishment (columns labeled “size”).  Data on establishments are from the County Business Patterns, 1977-
1994.  The terms of interaction are based on external financial dependence for mature Compustat firms and the ratio 
of total loans to assets for small firms based on the Federal Reserve 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance (see 
Table I).  The HHI, our measure of concentration, is built up from HHIs at the city level (Metropolitan Statistical 
Area).  By city, we construct the sum of squared share of deposits for each banking company.  We then average this 
concentration measure across all MSAs within the state, weighted by total deposits in each MSA (source: FDIC 
Summary of Deposits).  The post branching deregulation indicator equals 1 during all years in which a state permits 
instate branching; the post interstate banking deregulation indicator equals 1 during all years in which a state permits 
out-of-state banking companies to buy banks headquartered in the state.  For a detailed discussion of the banking 
deregulation, see Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  Industry share of employment equals the total employment in a 
given industry-state-year divided by total employment in the corresponding state-year.  Absolute value of t statistics 
in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
  
External Financial Dependence Measure: 
  
Indicator = 1 if industry 
has positive external 




Level of external 





loans/assets for firms in 









































































            





State * Year 
Industry * Year 
 
R-squared 0.89  0.56  0.89  0.56  0.86  0.62 
  
 




Economic Significance of a Change in Bank Competition  
on Establishment Size and Number of Establishments 
 
This table uses the coefficients from Table V to compute the effect of an increase in bank competition on log 
number of establishments (log of employees per establishment) on industries that are financially dependent relative 
to industries that are not financially dependent.  In columns 1 and 2, we report the effect of bank competition on 
industries with above median external financial dependence for mature Compustat firms, relative to industries with 
below median external financial dependence.  The coefficients come from columns 1 and 2 of Table V.  In columns 
3 and 4, we report the effect of bank competition on industries with external financial dependence for mature 
Compustat firms at the 75
th percentile of the distribution, relative to industries with external financial dependence at 
the 25
th percentile.  The coefficients come from columns 3 and 4 of Table V.  In columns 5 and 6, we report the 
effect of bank competition on industries with loans/assets for firms in the 1998 SSBF at the 75
th percentile, relative 
to industries at the 25
th percentile.  The coefficients come from columns 5 and 6 of Table V.  As in Table IV, 
‘unconcentrated’ markets have an HHI in the first quartile of the distribution (0.14); ‘concentrated’ markets have an 
HHI in the top quartile (0.24).  Regulated markets allow neither branching nor interstate banking; deregulated 
markets permit both. 
  
External Financial Dependence Measure based on: 
 
  Whether industry has 
positive external 
financial dependence for 
mature Compustat Firms 
 
Level of external financial 




loans/assets for firms in 













Relative effect (in percent) 
for a change from Fully 
Regulated to Fully 
Deregulated 
 
11.6% -12.3%  0.4%  -4.1%  1.2%  -22.0% 
Relative effect (in percent) 





4.6% -9.3%  3.6%  -6.9%  2.3%  -7.3% 








Regression of Logit of Size Shares on Bank Competition Variables 
 
 
This table reports coefficients from fixed effects regressions of the logit transformation of the share of 
establishments in different size bins in a state-industry-year.  We do not report the logit for the share of 
establishments with more than 1,000 employees because about ¾ of the observations are zero.  Data on 
establishments are from the County Business Patterns, 1977-1994.  External financial dependence is an indicator for 
industries with above-median use of external finance as a fraction of capital expenditures (see Table I).  The HHI, 
our measure of concentration, is built up from HHIs at the city level (Metropolitan Statistical Area).  By city, we 
construct the sum of squared share of deposits for each banking company.  We then average this concentration 
measure across all MSAs within the state, weighted by total deposits in each MSA (source: FDIC Summary of 
Deposits).  The post branching deregulation indicator equals 1 during all years in which a state permits instate 
branching; the post interstate banking deregulation indicator equals 1 during all years in which a state permits out-
of-state banking companies to buy banks headquartered in the state.  For a detailed discussion of the banking 
deregulation, see Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  Industry share of employment equals the total employment in a 
given industry-state-year divided by total employment in the corresponding state-year.  Absolute value of t statistics 
in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
  
Share of Establishments with: 
  
  
Fewer than 5 
Employees 
 
5 to 19 
Employees 
 
20 to 99  
Employees 
 


















            












            












            











            





State * Year 
Industry * Year 
 









Regression of Size Shares on Bank Competition Variables 
 
 
This table reports coefficients from fixed effects regressions of the share of establishments in different size bins in a 
state-industry-year.  Data on establishments are from the County Business Patterns, 1977-1994.  External financial 
dependence is an indicator for industries with above-median use of external finance as a fraction of capital 
expenditures (see Table I).  The HHI, our measure of concentration, is built up from HHIs at the city level 
(Metropolitan Statistical Area).  By city, we construct the sum of squared share of deposits for each banking 
company.  We then average this concentration measure across all MSAs within the state, weighted by total deposits 
in each MSA (source: FDIC Summary of Deposits).  The post branching deregulation indicator equals 1 during all 
years in which a state permits instate branching; the post interstate banking deregulation indicator equals 1 during all 
years in which a state permits out-of-state banking companies to buy banks headquartered in the state.  For a 
detailed discussion of the banking deregulation, see Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  Industry share of employment 
equals the total employment in a given industry-state-year divided by total employment in the corresponding state-
year.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
  
Share of Establishments with: 
  
  
Fewer than 5 
Employees 
 
5 to 19 
Employees 
 
20 to 99  
Employees 
 




















           














           














           













           





State * Year 
Industry * Year 
 
R-squared  0.37 0.26  0.29 0.41  0.23   
 
 
 
 
 